Asia-Pacific Counter-IED Fusion Center Monthly IED Activity Report

DOI: 31 January 2018

About the APCFC

The Asia-Pacific C-IED Fusion Center is the premier center for irregular warfare analysis in the U.S. Pacific Command. The center develops and synchronizes C-IED and EOD programs and regional engagements. The center resources USARAPC C-IED training to ensure U.S., Allied, and Partner Nations survivability.

APCFC CIED
Monthly IED Report

Click above to open the APCFC website

## Content

Executive Summary: In January, there were a total of 36 IED detonation events, 23 IED found and cleared events, and 24 IED cache events in the Asia-Pacific. Compared to last month, IED activity dropped by 40% across the entire region, however, there was a 22% increase in IED-related casualties. This increase was largely due to a single IED detonation in Thailand, resulting in 37 casualties. In South Asia, IED events decreased by 45% from last month. This was largely attributable to a major decrease in Nepal's IED events. In Northeast Asia, there were no reported IED events for the seventh consecutive month.

There were 83 IED events in the Asia-Pacific region in January 2018

LEGEND
- ◆ Detonation
- ◆ Found/Cleared
- ◆ Hoax
- ◆ Cache

Icons depict events for January 2018; heat map depicts event density from January 2017 - January 2018

January IED events
Detonation | Hoax
Found/Cleared | Cache

January IED events by Country
India, Philippines, Bangladesh, Thailand, Nepal, Burma

January IED Casualties
- CIV KIA
- CIV WIA
- HN KIA
- HN WIA
6, 22, 6, 54

This document is limited to those personnel performing military, intelligence, law enforcement, or security duties in support of C-IED operations.

January Asia-Pacific IED Events by Region

NSTR

NE Asia

19 | 26 | 18

S Asia

5 | 10 | 5

SE Asia

LEGEND
- Detonation
- Found/Cleared
- Hoax
- Cache

Number of events and type by region for January 2018

Executive Summary (Continued)

South Asia
In South Asia, IED events decreased from 115 events in December to 63 events in January. Despite this substantial decrease, there was a 39% increase in IED-related casualties. In Bangladesh, IED activity increased from December, although IED-related casualties continued to remain low (**see pg. 9**). In India, there was also an increase in IED activity (up 37%) following a surge in violence leading up to Republic Day (**see pg. 10**). In Nepal, IED attacks returned to normally low levels as election season concluded last month (**see pg. 11**).

Southeast Asia
In Southeast Asia, IED events marginally decreased from 23 events in December to 20 events in January. There was, however, a 16% increase in IED-related casualties compared to last month. In the Philippines, IED events increased by 56%, while IED-related casualties decreased by 62%. IED attacks attributed to the New People's Army (NPA) and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) were on the rise in January (**see pg. 13**). In Thailand, IED activity slightly decreased; however, a VBIED attack in Yala Province contributed to the country's highest number of IED-related casualties since May 2017 (**see pg. 14**).

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from OPEN SOURCES are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations. Event refers to specific IED activity categories: IED Detonation, IED Found/Cleared, IED Hoax, IED Cache.

PACOM IED Events - Past 12 Months

LEGEND
- ◆ Detonation (red)
- ◆ Found/Cleared (yellow)
- ◆ Hoax (green)
- ◆ Cache (blue)

Icons depict events from January 2017 to January 2018; occasional overlap occurs

Past Year IED Event Casualty Count

- CIV KIA (purple)
- CIV WIA (orange)
- HN KIA (light blue)
- HN WIA (yellow)

South Asia sees the highest level of IED events in the region, primarily due to India's high activity. IED activity across the region is often centered around periods of political unrest or contested elections. Devices thrown or emplaced during those outbreaks of violence vary widely in complexity (e.g. basic, command-wire to radio-controlled) and lethality.

Southeast Asia sees approximately half the activity of South Asia, with the Philippines and Thailand as the primary contributors to the number of events. While Thailand's IED activity is primarily attributable to Muslim-Malay insurgents in the south, the Philippines faces communist, jihadist, and Moro separatist threats. By comparison, attacks in Indonesia and Malaysia are far less frequent.

Northeast Asia sees relatively few IED attacks and they can often be attributed to an individual's act of protest against an employer, the government, or retaliation against an acquaintance. Disaffected groups, such as the Uyghurs in China, occasionally incorporate IEDs in their attacks. Press reporting from the region is limited and generally unreliable, therefore actual events are likely higher than shown here.

**Past Year IED events**

Past Year IED events by Country

Countries: India, Nepal, Philippines, Bangladesh, Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, China, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Maldives, South Korea

IED Activity - Past 12 Months

Switch Type

- CWIED
- RCIED
- VOIED
- Timed

CWIED 10% · RCIED 45% · VOIED 28% · Timed 17%

Group Affiliation

Group	Count
United Liberation Front of Assam	8
Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh	9
Maute Group (PHL)	15
Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (BUR)	18
Abu Sayyaf Group (PHL)	23
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)	27
Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters…	29
Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh	41
New People's Army (PHL)	88
Maoist/Naxalite (India)	105

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics are presumed to be approximations. Graphics represent known switch type and group affiliation.

Incident Highlight: Possible Weaponized sUAS in Burma

On 19 DEC 2016, the Burmese Army (Tatmadaw) opened fire on four small-Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS) thought to be conducting aerial reconnaissance over a base in Kachin State. According to Burmese media reports, three of the aircraft exploded in the air, but the fourth remained relatively undamaged and crashed to the ground. Tatmadaw forces found TNT strapped to the sUAS. It was also equipped with three batteries, one automatic flying system, one camera, five motors, one GPS, and one auto pilot sensor. The Burmese government has stated that the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) was likely controlling the sUAS.

This event may be the first reported weaponized sUAS recovered in the Asia-Pacific Region. It is unclear from available reporting whether the TNT was rigged to explode upon impact, or if it was rigged to explode when tampered with; it is also possible that the explosives on-board were intended to destroy the sUAS in the event that it was shot down or captured. The KIA has previously shown that it has RCIED technology, in addition to modern military arms and explosives (**see VOI**).

Images of the sUAS show a possible smart phone, batteries, and a low-light camera. The estimated life of the batteries would provide about 45 minutes of flying time. Depending on the intended purpose of the sUAS, this would limit the maximum flight distance to and from the target area. One usage for the possible smart phone is an RCIED initiator, or it could have been used for the camera, GPS or another capability.

In the coming months, it is possible that more instances of sUAS, (weaponized or non-weaponized) will occur in the Asia-Pacific, as VEOs can easily acquire this technology and the knowledge to employ them effectively proliferates throughout the region. These systems have the potential to change the way in which insurgencies collect information about government forces, as seen in Iraq and Syria (**see Special Assessment**). Likewise, governments' use of UAS against insurgents is expanding to include locating IEDs and other surveillance activities.

Images of one of the recovered sUAS including a cell phone, batteries, and a low-light camera

Sources: Chin Express (12/20/16) GNLM (12/21/16) Pantip

Special Assessment: Asia-Pacific Small-Unmanned Aerial Systems

The use of small-unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) by Islamic State and Iraq and Syria (ISIS) terrorists in the Middle East is not a localized phenomenon, but rather an asymmetric tactic employed by extremist, insurgent, and criminal organizations globally. The barriers to entry to acquire sUAS are low, particularly due to the ease associated to the acquisition of these systems and because the commercialization of drone technologies has reduced significantly the training and knowledge required for their effective operation. Thus, it was not surprising that ISIS–Philippines (ISIS-PHL) militants adopted sUAS systems for battlefield use during the siege of Marawi. Though this was not the first instance of the employment of sUAS by extremist organizations in the Asia-Pacific region, it has thus far been the most extensive and highlights the concerns over this expanding threat.

DJI Phantom drone used by ISIS-PHL shot down over Marawi City

Small-unmanned aerial systems provide terrorist groups with an airborne capability that can carry a variety of payloads. Early sUAS activities by ISIS militants in Iraq and Syria consisted of intelligence, surveillance, and recon-naissance (ISR) and spotting operations for indirect fire systems and snip-ers. To conduct these actions, ISIS affixed commercially available cameras to their sUAS systems, which provided either real-time video surveillance (typically via a commercial drone's data communication protocols or through more elaborate, improvised communication paths) or video and imagery for post-mission analysis. The sUAS threat in Iraq and Syria continued to evolve as ISIS engineers designed mechanisms for drones to carry and deploy small munitions. Similar to the IED, weaponized drones yielded both tactical and strategic effects: drone delivered munitions scattered Iraqi Army for-mations and destroyed equipment, while negatively impacting morale and stalling major offensives.

More advanced tactics, such as incorporating multiple drones, have also oc-curred in Syria. On the night of 5-6 JAN 2018, a swarm of approximately 10 drones descended on Humaymim Air Base, and a further three flew over Tartus Naval Station (both Russian bases in Syria). The fixed wing sUAS each carried a payload of eight to ten improvised mortars incorporating PETN explosives, and were guided by GPS and altimeters. Russian authorities identified the village of al-Muzarah as the location from which the swarm was launched; the village was 50km from Humaymim and 100km from Tartus. Despite images of the drones displaying crude construction from commonly available materials, the drones were effective at flying the distance to their presumed targets, indicating an above average grasp of drone technology. The Russian Minis-try of Defense claims that its military forces in Syria brought down and recovered 3 of the drones, that it shot down 7 of the drones using a Pantsir air defense missile system, and that 3 of the drones detonated from colli-sion with the ground. Additionally, Russia reported that there were no casualties or damage resulting from the attempted attacks on the bases.

The technology used in the attack is widely available from commercial sources. Long range, pre-programmed mission capability is featured in one open sourced project for UASs called ArduPilot. ArduPilot is software that can be configured to control ground, air and water borne platforms. The ArduPilot autopilot software runs on nu-merous chipsets found on popular vehicle controllers. A ground control application called Mission Planner works with the ArduPilot software and allows operators to control several vehicles, perform autonomous missions, way-point traveling, and to execute kinetic commands upon reaching a destination. The swarming capability in the Russian attack was demonstrated in 2015 by a team from the U.S. Naval Post Graduate School. The project involved 50 aircraft and used modified Commercial, Off-the-Shelf (COTS) equipment. The successful project demonstrat-ed communication between the aircraft, the challenges of ra-dio frequency management, the nuances of C2, and the chal-lenges of launching the aircraft.

To date, sUAS use by VEOs in the Asia-Pacific has primarily been for surveillance, with the majority of incidents committed by the compilation of groups that formed ISIS-PHL during the siege of Marawi. The majority of the systems were COTS quadcopters, whose form factor and battery life placed limits on range and payload. As such, absent modification, it is likely that these systems were restricted to short-range surveillance missions (i.e. photo and video reconnaissance at maximum ranges of approximately 5 to 7 kilometers from the system's

One of the drones used against Russian forces during the "drone swarm" attack; improvised mortars are at-tached to rails on the wings

Special Assessment: Asia-Pacific Small Unmanned Aerial Systems

sUAS recovered from two suspected Neo-JMB militants in Tangail, Bangladesh

operator). There were no known instances of the successful weaponization of a sUAS during the Marawi siege; however, it is quite reasonable to assume that the technical instructions required for such an action were readily available.

An additional instance of known sUAS activity conducted by VEOs in the region includes an attempt by Bangladeshi brothers, which security forces assert were members of the ISIS-affiliated Neo-JMB, to construct a homemade drone designed to "carry out attacks," despite the system's questionable capability to achieve the lift necessary to carry a payload of significant weight.

A lack of technical expertise and knowledge are the likely obstacles precluding militants in the Asia-Pacific from constructing more advanced drones that could handle a heavier payload to conduct attacks. The sole instance of potential weaponization of an sUAS in the Asia-Pacific occurred in Burma, though due to gaps in reporting, many questions remain unanswered about the intended use of this system (**see Device Highlight**). The sUAS used by the KIA insurgents was likely relatively simple with a very light payload, but it is possible that more complex TTPs will be developed and employed in the coming months and years. The low-observable, low-signature form factor inherent to commercial and hobbyist sUAS offers advantages in terms of the difficulty for detection by an opposing force; however, these benefits simultaneously limit the size and weight of a potential payload, as well as the ranges of these systems. Despite the likely availability of step-by-step manuals that depict the processes needed for weaponization, to conduct the modifications necessary to carry a significant payload while maintaining flight stability necessitates a measure of technical expertise and experience not readily available in extremist networks. Like hard to replace bomb makers, terrorist leaders covet and protect individuals in possession of these skills and tradecraft. Nonetheless, as ISIS-Core demonstrated a remarkable ability to recruit highly educated engineers and other technical experts, there exists a strong possibility that extremist organizations in the Asia-Pacific are striving to enlist such talent.

Though the use of sUAS by Asia-Pacific based militants has been limited, the use of these systems will likely expand as they offer materially weak organizations several advantages. First, commercially available and thus, easily accessible sUAS give extremist groups low-signature platforms to conduct surveillance operations, particularly in challenging operational environments such as major urban centers (e.g. Mosul, Raqqa, Marawi). Such activities seek to locate opposing force positions and to anticipate tactical movements, as well as to identify defensive weaknesses for exploitation by an assault force. Second, contingent upon successful weaponization, sUAS provides an organic platform for the aerial delivery of munitions. In particular, weaponized sUAS would increase the ability to target military facilities at distance with more precise control of payload delivery (as seen in the Russia event). Generally speaking, the use of asymmetric tactics (IEDs, ambushes, etc.) in the Asia-Pacific does not typically target hardened facilities, but tends to focus more on soft targets and exploiting the vulnerabilities of security forces during movements or convoys. If successful, however, the tactical effects of a small bomb dropped from a drone belie the strategic implications of such systems.

Violent extremist organizations in the Asia-Pacific region and globally, will continue to adapt COTS products and employ innovative methods to organically develop systems for battlefield use. Though VEOs in the Asia-Pacific have employed commercial and hobbyist sUAS in limited numbers and capacities, as the knowledge and expertise to use these systems continues to proliferate, it is a strong possibility that these organizations will develop this capability further to counter the military strengths of government forces.

Sources: GNLM (12/21/16) CTC (1/31/17) Newsweek (4/17/17) WeTalkUAV (7/17/17) BD News 24 (9/5/17) al-Jazeera (10/16/17) NYT (10/23/17) GMA Online (11/11/17) ScienceAlert (1/11/18) Janes (1/12/18)

Person of Interest / VEO of Interest

POI: Chhota Shakeel

ALIAS: Sheikh Shakeel Ahmed; Shaikh Shakil Babu Mohiddin; Chota Shakeel; Chhota R. Shakil; Shakeel Shaikh; Mohammed Shakeel Babu Miyan Shaikh; Rizwan; Shakeel Mohiuddin Babu Sheikh; Haji Mohammed **DOB:** 31 Dec 1955 (alt. DOB 1960)
AREAS OF OPERATION: Dubai, India, Pakistan **AFFLIATIONS:** D-Company, al-Qa'ida, Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT), Taliban, ISI

Chhota Shakeel is a top lieutenant and the most trusted aide of the leader of D-Company, Dawood Ibrahim. D-Company is one of the largest organized crime syndicates in South Asia. Shakeel joined D-Company in Dubai in 1988 and has remained the spokesperson for Dawood for nearly 30 years. Shakeel reportedly runs day-to-day operations and coordinates D-Company's dealings with other criminal and terrorist organizations. Shakeel moved to Pakistan in 1994, where he was offered protection by and provided support to the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). As of September 2017, news media reported Shakeel may be operating out of Dubai.

D-Company consistently aims to destabilize the Indian government through inciting riots, acts of terrorism and civil disobedience. D-Company also associates with and supports the ISI and various terrorist organizations to include AQ, LeT, and the Taliban. Notable collaboration includes allowing terrorist organizations to use D-Company's existing smuggling routes in South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa to facilitate the movement of weapons and personnel. D-Company's leadership is also believed to have supported the 1993 and 2008 Mumbai attacks through the provision of logistics and finances.

Due to a reported split with Dawood, Shakeel's future with D-Company is uncertain. In January 2017, there were also unsubstantiated rumors of Shakeel's death. Rumors have caused concern within the group, as well as with ISI leaders, who fear the split will impact their anti-India activities. With or without Shakeel, the multi-billion-dollar organization, D-Company, will continue its criminal activities and their goal of destabilizing India. Dawood's relationships with terrorist organizations are a prime example of how militant groups can utilize established transnational criminal networks to transfer weapons, personnel, and new TTPs.

Sources: OFAC (5/16/12) Indian Express (9/28/17) Hindustan Times (12/21/17) Telegraph (9/22/03) Hindu (7/11/16) NBC News (7/11/06) Times of India (12/18/08) Times of India (12/13/17)

VEO: Kachin Independence Organization (KIO)

AREA OF OPERATIONS: Kachin and Shan States, Burma **LEADER:** General N'Ban La **ASSOCIATED ORGANIZATIONS:** Northern Alliance groups, United Wa State Army **HEADQUARTERS:** Laiza, Burma

The Kachin are an ethnic group with traditional homelands in Kachin State, north Burma, Yunnan, China, and northeast India. In 1961, Kachin separatists formed the KIO and its armed wing, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) with the goal of protecting Kachin people from the Burmese Army (Tatmadaw) and developing an autonomous state. The KIO is funded through local taxation in separatist-controlled areas and income from the sale of jade and other natural resources in Kachin. The KIA states that it has 10,000 regular troops and an additional 10,000 reservists, making it one of the largest armed ethnic groups in Burma. The KIA, which is organized into eight brigades, fights against the Tatmadaw using both conventional and irregular means. While the majority of action against Tatmadaw forces is conventional, the KIA has used RCIEDs and sUAS **(see Device Highlight)**.

Conflict between ethnic Burmese and Kachin peoples started during World War II, when the Burmese sided with Imperial Japanese forces in the hope of expelling British colonial rule. The first Panglong Peace Conference occurred in 1947, ending with both ceasefire and political autonomy agreements; unfortunately, the agreements were never fully implemented, leading to further conflict and the creation of the KIO and KIA. Following decades of struggle, the KIO signed a ceasefire agreement with the Burmese government in 1994. This agreement stood until 2011, when the KIO protested the construction of a dam in Kachin to sell power to China. The re-initiation of hostilities in 2011 has left more than 100,000 civilians internally displaced. Starting in August 2016, hopes for peace were re-kindled as a part of the new Panglong Peace Conference, with the goal of creating lasting ceasefire agreement with insurgent groups operating in Burma. However, the KIO chose not to participate in the peace conference in May 2017 because it was only allowed observer status. One of the government prerequisites of participation was a complete and unconditional ceasefire, which the KIA refused to do, forcing them into an observer-only status.

It is unlikely that the KIO will reach a ceasefire or agreement with the Burmese government in the near future due to a fundamental disagreement over appropriate autonomy for ethnic minority leadership and the status of Tatamdaw in ethnic minority-controlled areas. Likewise, KIO's control of natural and financial resources in areas under their control could prolong hostilities with government troops.

Sources: Myanmar Peace Monitor (2015) Global Security (2016) Myanmar Times (5/23/17) Mizzima (6/1/17) RFA (7/5/17) RFA (7/8/17) ReliefWeb (10/12/17) RFA (1/5/18)

South Asia: January Significant Activity

Bangladesh

Bangladesh security forces killed 52 terrorists and arrested 906 more in raids across the country in 2017 according to a recent analysis of data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal. These included cadres of the Jamaat-e-Islami, Islami Chhatra Shibir, Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB)/Neo-JMB, Ansar al-Islam/Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), Harkat-ul -Jihad-al Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B), Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Jamaat-e-Taliban and Allah'r Dal. A total of 74 Islamist terrorists were killed in 2016 and 31 in 2015. Additionally, Bangladesh killed 15 Left Wing Extremist (LWE) terrorists in 2017. These included operatives of the Purbo Banglar Communist Party and Purbo Banglar Sarbahara Party. In 2016 and 2015, 18 and 17 LWE terrorists were killed respectively. **Indian Defence Review (1/19/18) SATP (1/28/18)**

India

On 1 JAN, media reported that Pakistan is allegedly planning on seizing charities and other financial assets controlled by Hafiz Saeed, the leader of LeT. In a document acquired by media sources from the Finance Ministry directed law enforcement and provincial governments to submit an action plan to "takeover" Saeed's two charities, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) and the Falah-e-Insaniat (FIF) Foundation. The United States has labelled both groups as "terrorist fronts." **Algemeiner (1/1/18)**

On 20 JAN, media reported that four months prior to January's Bodh Gaya Temple attack, an Indian Mujahedeen (IM) operative identified as Taushif Sagir Khan Pathan was detained in Gaya. The presence of an IM operative alludes to the possibility of a "sleeper cell of Islamic terrorists" in the area. **Hindustan Times (1/20/18) Hindustan Times (1/20/18)**

On 20 JAN, security officials reported that the IM co-founder, Abdul Subhan Qureshi, was detained by Delhi police, following a brief exchange of small arms fire. Qureshi is believed to be the mastermind behind the 2008 attack in Ahmedabad, which resulted in at least 56 deaths. He was also allegedly involved in the July 2006 Mumbai train attack, and was reportedly the IM's top IED maker. **Hindu (1/22/18) Swarajyamag (1/22/18) ANI News (1/22/18) News Week (1/22/18) Hindu (1/22/18)**

On 20 JAN, media reported that security agencies have identified vulnerabilities in the Arunachal Pradesh-Burma border region where militants seem to be using the mountainous terrain to cross between the countries. According to security forces, the terrain is difficult to pass during rainy seasons, but the winter season provides for easier travels. **Assam Tribune (1/21/18)**

On 26 JAN, an 18-year old Pune woman, identified as Sadiya Anwar, was arrested after a tip-off claiming that she may be "suicide bomber" who could be targeting the Republic Day parade venue in Jammu and Kashmir. Officials of the Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) reported that, as a minor, Sadiya was intrigued by ISIS ideology after watching a documentary and doing her own research; this led her to make online contact with other ISIS sympathizers. During an interrogation in December 2015 Sadiya confirmed her intention to travel to Syria, leading authorities to place her under surveillance. **First Post (1/26/18) Indian Express (1/26/18) Pune Mirror (1/26/18)**

Maldives

On 10 JAN, the U.S. State Department issued a travel advisory for the Maldives, citing the possibility of terrorist activity in local government infrastructure and in areas frequented by foreign tourists. The UK issued similar caution in September 2017. Following both advisories, Maldivian authorities downplayed the danger out of concern for economic impacts on tourism. On 23 JAN, the German foreign ministry also updated its travel guidance for the Maldives following raids on several resorts. **Maldives Independent (1/13/18) Mihaaru (1/14/18) Maldives Independent (1/15/18) Maldives Independent (1/23/18)**

In mid-January, the media wing of Syria-based Maldivian fighters, Bilad al-Sham, released a jihad training video used for recruiting purposes. The dual-language (Arabic and Dhivehi) video shows trainees conducting drills and reciting verses from the Koran. The video was released days after he Maldives' main CT body, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), announced it would be blocking religious extremist websites online, with the goal of reducing the potential of online radicalization. Bilad al-Sham had previously released a video in 2016 threatening the Maldivian government, to include current and past presidents. **Maldives Independent (1/16/18) Maldives Independent (1/20/18)**

On 22 JAN, in his first speech of 2018, former president Nasheed highlighted two concerning trends in the Maldives that should affect voting in upcoming elections. The first is the loosening of restrictions related to the sale of islands and infrastructure to foreign actors, undermining Maldivian control of their own lands. The second is the rising tide of Islamic extremism, as evidenced by the reported increase in the number of Maldivians attempting to leave for Syria. Additionally, he supported the travel advisory posted by the US State Department. **Maldives Independent (1/22/18) Mihaaru (1/16/18)**

Sri Lanka

On 8 JAN, Swiss authorities started the trial for 13 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, alias Tamil Tigers) financiers for funneling USD 15.3 million to the insurgency from 1999 to 2009. The 13 suspects are believed to have created a complex system to draw money from the Tamil diaspora communities, and are charged with fraud, false documentation, money laundering, and extortion. **Daily Mirror (1/5/18)**

Bangladesh: January IED Events

There were two IED detonation events and six IED cache events.

On 1 JAN, police detectives recovered an IED cache and arrested two suspected Neo-JMB members near Shubhopur Bus Station, West Madarbarhi, Sadarghat. The cache contained 10 grenades and two suicide vests. **BD News (1/2/18)**

On 3 JAN, unidentified suspects threw an IED at an activist of the Bangladesh Chattra League outside a residence in Chandrapur, Jhikargacha, Jessore; one civilian was killed. Police suspect that a rival faction conducted the attack. **Dhaka Tribune (1/3/18)**

On 7 JAN, the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) recovered an IED cache during a raid on a residence in Kanaighat, Sylhet; three Neo-JMB members were arrested. The cache contained 300 pieces of explosive gel and 300 sets of detonators; authorities suspect the materials may have been smuggled from a mine in Meghalaya, India. **Daily Star (1/9/18)**

On 12 JAN, the RAB recovered an IED cache during a 14-hour raid on a suspected Neo-JMB safe house in West Nakhalpara, Tejgaon, Dhaka; three suspected militants were killed and five others were arrested. The cache contained three suicide vests, 14 IEDs, detonators, four containers of explosive gel and IED manufacturing equipment. Police suspect they were planning attacks in the Dhaka area. **Dhaka Tribune (1/12/18)**

On 23 JAN, the Detective Branch of police recovered an IED cache following the arrest of a lab assistant from Cantonment College near Three Road Junction on Airport Road in Jessore. The cache contained 500 grams each of white and yellow explosive powders. Authorities suspect the lab assistant had been supplying chemicals to Neo-JMB militants for some time. **Dhaka Tribune (1/24/18)**

On 31 JAN, the RAB recovered an IED cache from two Neo-JMB militants in Kashiyanga, Rajshahi; two suspects were arrested. The cache contained 1kg gunpowder, 2560g soda, and various bomb making materials. **Dhaka Tribune (2/1/18)**

IED activity in January remained low, making it the eighth consecutive month with fewer than 10 events. Police and RAB forces continued to pro-actively engage elements of the Neo-JMB throughout the country, effectively preventing any major attacks. According the media, Neo-JMB has not conducted a successful attack in months due to the increased vigilance of Bangladeshi security forces. The only detonation was likely politically motivated between fighting factions.

The aggressive stance of security forces will likely continue to disrupt Neo-JMB operational activity in the coming months.

LEGEND
- Detonation
- Found/Cleared
- Hoax
- Cache

Dhaka

Past Year IED Events by Type

Past Year IED Event Casualty Count

CIV KIA   CIV WIA   HN KIA   HN WIA

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

India: January IED Events

Past Year IED Events by Type

Past Year IED Event Casualty Count

There were 22 IED detonation events, 17 IED found and cleared events, and 13 IED cache events.

On 6 JAN, an IED detonated against a group of 3rd BN Indian Reserve Police in Sopore, Baramulla, Jammu and Kashmir; four police personnel were killed and one was injured. The IED was emplaced in a lane between two bazaars, both of which were closed due to a general strike called by insurgents. Police claim it is the first IED attack since 2015, and Jaish-e Mohammed (JeM) claimed responsibility. **Times of India (1/6/18) Times of India (1/7/18) Hindustan Times (1/6/18)**

On 13 and 14 JAN, security forces found and cleared two separate IEDs around Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir. The first device weighed 5kg and was found along the Srinagar-Baramulla highway, and the second IED was found the next day in the Maloora area. **Hindustan times (1/13/18) Indian Express (1/13/18) Hindustan Times (1/14/18)**

On 15 JAN, Indian Army personnel recovered an IED cache following an attempted infiltration by JeM militants at Jhelum river, Uri, North Kashmir. The militants were spotted while preparing to cross the river, opened fire on Army personnel when challenged, and were killed in the ensuing gunfight. The cache indicated the group was planning a fidayeen attack and included nine IEDs, four AK-47 rifles, three under-barrel grenade launchers (UBGL) with 38 UBGL grenades, and 23 hand grenades. **New Indian Express (1/15/18)**

On 19 JAN, an IED detonated and Central Reserve Police Force personnel found and cleared two IEDs at the Bodh Gaya temple complex in Gaya, Bihar. The devices reportedly weighed 7-10kg and were kept in thermos-like containers with wires and batteries attached to them. The devices appeared to be targeting the crowds gathered for the Dalai Lama's visit, but detonated prematurely and resulted in no casualties. Following an investigation, police suspected that the Neo-JMB were responsible for the attack. **Indian Express (1/22/18) Hindustan Times (1/20/18) Times of India (1/28/18)**

On 31 JAN, Kolkata Police Special Task Force personnel recovered an IED cache during raids against a Neo-JMB cell in Samserganj, Murshidabad, West Bengal; two suspected militants were arrested. The detainees admitted to conducting the Bodh Gaya temple attack on 19 JAN, and said the attack was to "avenge the continued genocide and torture of the Rohingyas in Myanmar." The cache contained 50kg of ammonium nitrate, IED construction material, and incriminating documents. **Times of India (2/2/18)**

Overall IED activity significantly increased this month compared to January 2017, as groups nationwide conducted IED attacks in the lead-up to India's Republic Day celebrations on 26 JAN. While this escalation is typical, the numbers were increased substantially by JeM reasserting its presence in Jammu and Kashmir by conducting the first IED attacks in several years; additionally, attacks in Jammu and Kashmir have started earlier than expected. Increased IED events in northeast India also contributed to elevated activity in January.

Notably, the Neo-JMB conducted its first attack in India, targeting the Dalai Lama on behalf of the Rohingya. Subsequent interrogations of suspects arrested on 31 JAN revealed a more extensive Neo-JMB network within West Bengal and Neo-JMB leadership has called for further attacks in India.

*IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.*

Nepal: January IED Events

Past Year IED Events by Type

There were two IED detonation events and one IED cache event.

On 18 JAN, an IED detonated, and two IEDs were found and cleared in a field near Gramthan-6, Morang, Koshi; one civilian was injured. The detonation occurred when a civilian attempted to open the IED. Responding police recovered the other two IEDs from the site. **Nepal Monitor (1/18/18)**

On 24 JAN, a pressure cooker IED detonated outside the residence of the local mayor in Godawari, Kailali, Seti. **Nepal Monitor (1/24/18)**

IED activity was consistent with historical norms in January, following extreme spikes in 2017 due to elections. Low-level violence continued in January, though very little of this violence was IED-related.

Protests and vandalism occurred in several areas where the district and provincial seats are being determined. Some of these protests have been violent or led to blockades (bandh). In one such event, 24 protestors and four police were injured in escalating violence. Local government offices were also vandalized, and police resorted to firing warning shots and using tear gas, and finally, a baton charge to stop the protestors. These types of incidents occur regularly during protests in Nepal, and some human rights advocates have decried the actions of the police as an abuse of power.

In the coming months protests will likely continue, but will probably not include a high number of IED events. Now that elections have occurred, it is highly likely that IED violence will remain at historical norms, though it could spike again if promises made by the government and elected officials are not kept.

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Southeast Asia: January Significant Activity

Southeast Asia Cooperation

On 23 JAN, Indonesian Defense Minister Ryamizad Ryacudu met with US Secretary of Defense James Mattis to discuss how the US can help facilitate with the development of the intelligence-sharing platform known as the 'Our Eyes' initiative (OEI). The initiative, which will involve Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, Singapore, and the Philippines was soft-launched on 25 JAN following a January meeting of senior defense officials from member states. OEI is advertised as an information-sharing platform to facilitate the exchange of intelligence on terrorism, radicalism, and violent extremism. In theory, the OEI, like other intraregional initiatives such as the Sulu-Sulawesi patrols, should help improve cooperation in addressing counterterrorism efforts. **Asia News Network (1/24/18) Diplomat (1/27/18)**

Philippines

On 21 JAN, the Philippine National Police (PNP) arrested an Iraqi-national, Taha Mohamed al-Jabouri, after the Iraq embassy in Manila alerted local authorities about his presence. al-Jabouri came to the Philippines in August as the country was preparing for the ASEAN summit and still engaged in the Marawi siege. He is described as a chemist with knowledge of explosives and is known to have ties with Middle East militant extremist groups, such as Hamas. Police say he came to the Philippines to meet with a Chinese company who hired him as a consultant, but when he refused to say for what, authorities confiscated his expired travel documents, along with different denominations of foreign currency. Despite the suspicious nature of al-Jabouri's presence, police have yet to identify links to local militant groups. **Benar News (1/22/18)**

Naval Forces Western Mindanao now receives regular training from the Australian Defence Forces, with particular emphasis on military operations in urban terrain. Originally organized for amphibious operations, the Marines' focus has changed due to the siege of Marawi and shifting operational environments. The US Navy is also providing operational training to Philippine sailors; primary topics include ship-boarding procedures, interception, and encounters on the high seas. The Naval Special Operations Group are being trained on detecting, controlling, and disrupting IEDs. Philippine authorities expect the trainings will increase security in urban areas. **Philippine Star (1/24/18)**

On 31 JAN, National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP) consultant, Rafael Baylosis, was rearrested in Quezon City. The NDFP is the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) political wing, with the New People's Army (NPA) serving as the CPP's armed wing. Following the termination of peace talks, President Duterte ordered the rearrests of NDFP personnel who were set free for the talks. An NDFP senior advisor says the arrest is a violation of the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (Jasig), a peace pact between the NDFP and the government. The Jasig is supposed to ensure those participating in peace negotiations have immunity from surveillance, harassment, search, arrest, detention, prosecution or interrogation. The government says the Jasig is now deemed "ineffective" since the peace talks were terminated. **Sun Star (2/1/18)**

Thailand

On 14 JAN, 52-year old Pakistani Mohammad Iqbal was arrested at his Bangkok apartment for forging passports and supplying them to ISIS. Amongst the contraband recovered from the apartment were passports from Singapore and India as well as visas into France, Italy and Spain. According to sources, Iqbal was likely falsifying passports from Thailand approximately 10 years. During a press conference on 19 JAN, authorities also disclosed that the suspect catered to all customers in addition to ISIS. **South China Morning Post (1/19/18) Sky News (1/19/18)**

On 26 JAN, a team of students from King Mongkut's University of Technology North Bangkok (KMUTNB) developed several prototypes of an EOD robot. This initiative was an effort to improve the safety of EOD operations by reducing the risk to officers. It is designed to inspect potential bombs and then use a high-pressure water gun to disable the device. It has the ability to travel one meter per second, climb a 45-degree angle and haul a 15kg object. The wireless remote control has a radius of 150 meters and is also equipped with robotic arms which can lift up to 5kg. **Nation (1/26/18)**

In January, Thai authorities introduced a new security measure for all SIM cards, requiring the collection of biometric data upon purchase. Previously, only individuals purchasing pre-paid SIM cards were required to be biometrically enrolled, but it is now required for post-paid SIM cards as well. Fingerprints and facial scans will be linked to the card's phone number and stored in the National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission database. This directive was implemented in an effort to mitigate the ongoing bombings that use mobile phones to remotely detonate IEDs. Critics of the security measure cite potential privacy concerns and violations from this measure. **Chiang Rai Times (1/30/18)**

Burma

Since the end of December, fighting has intensified between the KIA and Tatmadaw in several towns in Kachin State. The fighting has trapped several thousand civilians in the area and forced others to flee. Using mortars, small arms, and other conventional weapons, the KIA attacked military and security forces headquarters in the area around Moe Kaung. Recovered from the area was an unexploded 107mm mortar, and there were several reported injuries. The Tatmadaw retaliated with airstrikes and other offensive measures. China has been attempting to broker a peace deal between the KIA and Tatmadaw, though future success of such talks remains uncertain amid continued conflict. **Irrawaddy (1/30/18) Irrawaddy (2/1/18) Reuters (2/2/18) GNLM (2/4/18)**

Philippines: January IED Events

LEGEND
🔴 Detonation
🟠 Found/Cleared
🟢 Hoax
🔵 Cache

Manila

Past Year IED Events by Type

Past Year IED Event Casualty Count

CIV KIA   CIV WIA   HN KIA   HN WIA

There were seven IED detonation events, three IED found and cleared events, and four IED cache events.

On 1 JAN, a roadside IED detonated against a military truck by suspected Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) in Limpongo, Datu Hoffer Ampatuan, Maguindanao, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), Mindanao. The detonation resulted in the injury of two soldiers. **Sun Star (1/3/18)**

On 8 JAN, a joint search operation of police and Army forces recovered an IED cache from a room at the Inn along MCLL Highway in Divisoria, Zamboanga (District 2), Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga Peninsula, Mindanao. The operation resulted in the arrest of an alleged Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) bomb maker and trainer along with one Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil (ANFO) IED and 5kg Ammonium Nitrate. The suspect claims he was assisting his cousin who was hired and paid P30,000 by a politician to assemble the IED which was intended for a public figure in Tawi-Tawi. **InterAksyon (1/9/18) Zamboanga Today (1/11/18)**

On 15 JAN, Army EOD found and cleared an IED along the national highway in Satan, Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao, ARMM, Mindanao. The device was rigged from an 81-mm mortar, cut nails, metal shards and a cellphone as a trigger mechanism. Authorities reported the device was a signature style of the BIFF, who have been the target of military operations. **Philippine News Agency (1/15/18)**

On 20 JAN, the 66th Infantry Battalion recovered an IED cache following a clash with New People's Army (NPA) rebels in Tadia, Bantacan, New Bataan, Compostela Valley, Davao, Mindanao. Following the hour-long firefight, the following cache items were recovered: nine IEDs, one rifle grenade, electrical wires and blasting paraphernalia, five cellphones, one handheld radio, medical kits and subversive documents. **Inquirer Mindanao (1/21/18)**

On 22 JAN, an IED cache was recovered following the arrest of a Spanish-national in Maluso, Basilan, ARMM, Basilan. The cache contained a rifle grenade, one hand grenade, blasting caps, detonation devices, passport, credit card and cash. The suspect, who is said to have been with an ASG member, had an expired tourist visa and has denied all the allegations. **Inquirer (1/24/18) Manila Bulletin (1/24/18)**

This month, IED activity was slightly elevated from the previous month due to attacks by the NPA and the BIFF. Security forces have intensified their operations against both groups, resulting in losses to both sides. The NPA lost eighteen men as a result of these focused military operations and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) accepted close to 200 surrenders this month. The AFP has promised to end the communist insurgency by the end of the year as peace negotiations are still halted and are likely to remain stalled until NPA attacks stop.

The AFP reported that ISIS-Philippines (ISIS-PHL) is still attempting to establish a caliphate in southern Philippines. The AFP cite recent activity by ISIS-PHL elements to include an intensification of operational and recruitment activity by the Maute Group. Using money looted during the Marawi campaign, the Maute Group has lured approximately 250 new fighters, who are undergoing IED and urban combat training given by militants operating in the south.

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Thailand: January IED Events

Past Year IED Events by Type

Past Year IED Event Casualty Count

There were two IED detonation events, one IED found and cleared event, and one IED cache event.

On 5 JAN, an IED failed to detonate after being thrown by insurgents at the residence of a defense volunteer during a firefight in Tak Bai, Narathiwat. The device was described as a pipe bomb and was rendered safe by EOD. Approximately five to six insurgents had attacked the home with M16 assault rifles and 9mm pistols. **Nation (1/6/18)**

On 7 JAN, an IED cache was recovered from a rubber plantation in Sisakorn, Narathiwat, following the testimony of a detained individual. The cache was recovered from two locations, approximately 5-200 meters apart on the property. It contained one 15kg cooking-gas cylinder, two M16 assault rifles, 30 rounds of ammunition, one magazine, and two 1-litre plastic bottles filled with iron pieces. It is suspected this location was used to plan the 26 DEC 2017 ambush on rangers that resulted in casualties. **Nation (1/8/18)**

On 10 JAN, an RCIED detonated against a passing ranger patrol in Tambon Bang Khao, Nong Chik, Pattani; six rangers sustained injuries and two suspects were detained. The patrol was en route to investigate the torching of security cameras the previous night. **Bangkok Post (1/10/18) Daily Star (1/10/18) Nation (1/11/18)**

On 22 JAN, a VBIED detonated at the Pimolchai food market in Muang, Yala; three civilians were killed and 34 sustained injuries. The incident occurred after a man parked a motorcycle near a food stall and quickly fled. When the stall owner went to move the motorcycle 10 minutes later, the device detonated. Authorities recovered chopped steel rods and electronic parts from the blast site and estimate that the devices weighed 20kg. Those responsible were a combat unit of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) known as the Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK). Officials detained two suspects, one of which is the leader of the RKK. Authorities have not yet confirmed the motive behind the attack, however it is believed the attack on civilians may have been a retaliation against officials. **Bangkok Post (1/22/18) Nation (1/22/18) NDTV (1/22/18) Bangkok Post (1/24/18) Thai PBS (1/24/18)**

January IED activity remained consistent with levels from previous months, with less than 10 events per month since the spike of activity in April 2017. Despite low activity levels, the casualties were higher in January due to the 22 JAN VBIED in Yala. While the device itself seems to fit with historical norms of Southern Thai Insurgency (STI) TTPs, the targeting of civilians with no ties to the government is less common, as compared to the usual attacks on defense volunteers and teacher escorts.

The current IED activity rate will likely continue throughout the month of February. Any upcoming attacks will likely be perpetrated by the STI to create civil unrest and discredit security forces conducting operations in the Deep South.

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Burma: January IED Events

There was one IED detonation event and one IED found and cleared event.

On 5 JAN, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) conducted a complex attack by detonating an IED against a passing military convoy truck and engaging Tatmadaw in small arms fire in Tarein, Maungdaw, Rakhine; six soldiers and one civilian were wounded by the IED detonation. **Radio Free Asia (1/9/18)**

On 13 JAN, Tatmadaw soldiers found and cleared an RCIED from under a rice truck in Muse, Northern Shan. The truck was parked in a trade zone. **GNLM (1/15/18)**

January IED activity remained low for the fourth consecutive month, though ARSA did conduct a complex attack against security forces. The development of ARSA's attack TTPs and technology over the last year has shown a maturing skill set that may further advance in the future. Most of the activity and fighting in Burma during the month of January was confined to Kachin State, and primarily incorporated conventional weapons. In the upcoming month, it is likely that IED activity will remain low.

LEGEND
- Detonation
- Found/Cleared
- Hoax
- Cache

Rangoon

Past Year IED Events by Type

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Return to first page

Malaysia: January IED Events

There was one IED detonation event.

On 1 JAN, two IEDs detonated after being thrown near a church following a dispute between two motorcycle gangs in Petaling Jaya, Selangor; three civilian bystanders were wounded. The IEDs were described as "water bombs," which are sometimes used for blast fishing. One device landed on the road shoulder and the other detonated at the church's entrance. **Malay Mail Online (1/1/18) Malaysiakini (1/18/18)**

IED activity in Malaysia remains consistently low. This attack was typical of most attacks in Malaysia, which are criminal in nature. Although the device composition was not revealed, blast fishing is a common practice in Southeast Asia and often incorporates the use of black powder.

Indonesia: January IED Events

There was one IED detonation event.

On 1 JAN, an unidentified assailant threw an IED that detonated near the Bontoala Police Station in Makassar, South Sulawesi; two police officers were wounded. Police described the device composition as a "low-grade explosive usually used in demonstrations, but it contained additional gunpowder, gasoline, and nails." **Jakarta Post (1/2/18) Jakarta Post (1/3/18)**

IED activity in Indonesia remains consistently low. Although police have bene unable to identify the attacker so far, the 1 JAN attack was most likely conducted by a Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) militant. South Sulawesi is amongst JAD's highest recruitment areas and their militants have been known to gather in Makassar City. Additionally, police stations are primary targets of JAD. This scale of single-person or small-cell level of attacks from JAD on police facilities can be expected to continue.

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

The two events included on this page are not included in the graphs for January, as they occurred on 31 DEC 17 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). They are, therefore, reflected in the graphs for December 2017.

Northeast Asia: January Significant Activity

Uyghur Extremism

According to an 18 JAN report, another AQ-linked jihadist group, Katibat al-Ghurba (alias Katibal al-Ghuraba al-Turkestan (KGT)), emerged in Syria and possibly Afghanistan in July 2017. The group is assessed to be small and composed of militants from several different countries. KGT is geared primarily towards the Uyghur militant community, and its online propaganda is exclusively in the Uyghur language. The focus of their propaganda is primarily on China and its campaign against Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region. Uploaded videos by the group include combat footage and instructions on how to operate BMPs and T55 tanks. Moreover, these videos feature prominent AQ figures, clips from AQ branches and the Afghan Taliban, and overall AQ ideological references. **LWJ (1/18/18)**

China

In mid-January, media reported that Chinese authorities are testing an advanced facial detection system on Uyghur civilians in Xinjiang. In August of 2017, Cloud walk, a government-backed technology firm, introduced facial recognition tools that include "Fire Eye," a system that identifies people through a face scan. The new technology, most likely developed by the state-run China Electronics Technology Group, was first used in 2015 in transportation terminals. Its initial use of verifying the ID of travelers has since advanced to a network that is installed at residents' homes and workplaces, and that is used at checkpoints. Critics of China's actions in Xinjiang expressed concern for basic human rights and have stated that increased surveillance (to include CCTV and facial detection) are creating conditions ideal for a police state. **DM (1/19/18)**

IED Calendar

The IED calendar was established to help our audience maintain awareness of events, such as anniversaries of major attacks, or political, religious or cultural events that often coincide (or can potentially coincide) with a spike in IED events.

4 JAN (BUR): Independence Day

26 JAN (IND): Republic Day

Late January to early February (WW): Attacks have coincided with the anniversary of worldwide protests to Danish Cartoons in 2006

28 FEB (THA): First time Thai Gov. and insurgents sign a peace agreement

12 MAR (IND): Anniversary of 1993 Mumbai attack

13 MAR (THA): Anniversary of founding of Barisan Revolusi Nasional

15-16 MAR (IND): United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) Army Raising Day

IND – India
BUR – Burma
THA – Thailand
WW – Worldwide

	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
January 2018	31	1	2	3	4 BUR	5	6
	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
	21	22 WW	23 WW	24 WW	25 WW	26 WW	27 WW
	28 WW	29 WW	30 WW	31 WW	1 WW	2 WW	3 WW
February 2018	4 WW	5	6	7	8	9	10
	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
	25	26	27	28 THA	1	2	3
March 2018	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	11	12 IND	13 THA	14	15 IND	16 IND	17
	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Common Terms and Acronyms

AN – Ammonium Nitrate
ANFO – Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil
ARMM – Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
CIV – Civilian
CBRN – Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
COIN – Counter-insurgency
CWIED – Command Wire IED
DTMF – Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency
EFP – Explosively Formed Projectile
EOD – Explosive Ordnance Disposal
F/C – Found & Cleared
HME – Homemade Explosives
HN – Host Nation (Police, Military, Government)
IDF – Indirect Fire
IDP – Internally Displaced Persons
IED – Improvised Explosive Device
KFR – Kidnap for Ransom
KIA – Killed in Action
LOC – Line of Communication
LPG – Liquefied Petroleum Gas
MSR – Main Supply Routes
NFI – No Further Information
NSTR – Nothing Significant To Report
PBA – Post Blast Analysis
PBIED – Personnel Borne (Suicide Bomb) IED

PCB – Printed Circuit Board
PN – Partner Nation
PPIED – Pressure Plate IED
QRF – Quick Response Force
RCIED – Radio Controlled IED
RCP – Route Clearance Patrols
RPG – Rocket Propelled Grenade
SA – South Asia
SAF – Small Arms Fire
SEA – Southeast Asia
SVBIED – Suicide Vehicle Borne IED
TATP – Triacetone Triperoxide
TNT – Trinitrotoluene (C7H5N3O6)
TTP – Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
UXO – Unexploded Ordnance
VBIED – Vehicle Borne IED
VEO – Violent Extremist Organization
VOIED – Victim Operated IED
WIA – Wounded in Action

Governments, Groups and Organizations

ASG – Abu Sayyaf Group
BIFF – Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
BIPP – Barisan Islam Perberbasan Patani
BRN-C – Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate
BSF – Border Security Forces
BNP – Bangladesh National Party
BriMob – Mobile Brigade (Indonesia CT Forces)
CPI-M – Communist Party of India (Maoist)
CPN-M – Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
CPP – Communist Party of the Philippines
CRPF – Central Reserve Police Force (India)
GMIP – Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani
HM – Hizb-ul-Mujahideen
HNLC – Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (India)
HUJI-B – Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami Bangladesh
IB – India's Intelligence Bureau
IM – Indian Mujahideen
IrW – Irregular Warfare
ISI – Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)
ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq ash Sham
JAT – Jemaah Ansharout Tauhid
JI – Jemaah Islamiya
JTMM – Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha
JIB – Jemaat-e-Islami Bangladesh
JeM – Jaish-e-Mohammed

JMB – Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh
JMJB – Jama'atul Muslim Janta Bangladesh
KIA – Kachin Independence Army
KIM – Khalifa Islamiya Mindanao
KIO – Kachin Independence Organization
LeT – Lashkar-e Tayyiba
MILF – Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MILF-SOG – MILF-Special Operations Group
MNLF – Moro National Liberation Front
NPA – New People's Army
PNP – Philippine National Police
POLRI – Indonesian National Police
PULO – Patani United Liberation Organization
RAB – Rapid Action Battalion (Bangladesh)
RKK – Runda Kumpulan Kecil
SJMM – Samyukta Jatiya Mukti Morcha
SJTMM – Samyukta Jana Tantrik Terai Mukti Morcha
ULFA – United Liberation Front of Assam
UWSA – United Wa State Army
YCL –Youth Communist League